Two problems Naumann Named — And The Formation Regimen That Addresses Both

In Kansas, a majority of the nine-member commission that screens candidates for the state Supreme Court is chosen by members of the Kansas Bar Association: five lawyer-members elected by Kansas Bar attorneys, against four non-lawyers appointed by the Governor. That commission narrows every vacancy down to three finalists; the Governor then makes the actual appointment from that shortlist. Archbishop Joseph Naumann's diagnosis, in the National Catholic Register, targets that narrowing step specifically: the bar-majority commission functions as the gatekeeper controlling who the Governor is even allowed to choose from, with "no public vetting of candidates, no media scrutiny, and no citizen input beyond" what Naumann calls "a small group of lawyers."[^1] Most Kansans, he notes, are not aware how vulnerable that arrangement is to the influence of special-interest groups.[^1] The Kansas Right-to-Vote Judicial Selection measure on the 2026 ballot would change that, opening the process to broader public accountability.

Naumann's argument for the measure is structural: courts exist to ensure that laws conform to constitutional limits, not to serve the interests of any professional guild, and a nomination process controlled by one politically active association concentrates in a bar association precisely the kind of gatekeeping power courts are supposed to check.

But Naumann's commentary carries a second argument, distinct from the structural one. "For our nation to continue to prosper and protect the God-given dignity of every human life," he writes, "Americans need to strive to be virtuous and engaged citizens."[^1] Seeing what is actually at stake in the Kansas arrangement, past whatever a ballot summary conveys, takes a person who has been formed rather than a person who has simply been informed. Naumann names two problems: a gap in judicial selection, and a deficit in the moral formation of citizens. What follows is a regimen for addressing the second.

A formed conscience, not a consulted instinct

Conscience in the Catholic tradition is a capacity that must be cultivated. John Paul II, in Veritatis Splendor, describes the well-formed conscience as requiring more than abstract knowledge of moral law. What is necessary is "a sort of connaturality between man and the true good," rooted in the cardinal virtues, prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance, and animated by faith, hope, and charity.[^2] A person shaped by those dispositions perceives moral reality differently than someone approaching ethics as a set of rules to decode.

William Nordling's chapter on practical reason in the Catholic Meta-Model of the Person describes good moral judgment as something irreducible to rule-following: it draws on multiple sources of insight, on developed character, and on a person's actual commitments and experience, not on a fixed procedure that could be run like a calculation.[^3] The voter Naumann describes is precisely this: someone whose judgments are shaped by character.

William May, teaching on conscience formation in Catholic moral theology, draws a further distinction between those whose erroneous judgments stem from invincible ignorance and those who refuse to form their consciences, who fail to seek truth when they could.[^4] Formation is what makes the first kind of error less likely and the second kind less excusable.

The regimen

For Catholics engaged in civic life, conscience formation works across four disciplines, disciplines that apply equally to voting, professional decisions, family life, and every other sphere where a person must weigh competing goods and act under genuine complexity.

Examination of conscience as a discipline of attention. More than a preparation for confession: a regular practice of asking what a person actually perceived in a given situation, and whether that perception was honest. Fear, tribalism, and disordered attachments distort moral vision regardless of how much information a person accumulates. Formation addresses the perceiver.

Study of the Church's social teaching as a framework. A set of principles for reading institutional arrangements, human dignity, subsidiarity, solidarity, the common good, rather than a checklist for filling out a ballot. The Kansas judicial selection question is legible within this framework — subsidiarity asks who should exercise which power, and dignity asks whose voice is excluded from consequential decisions.

Cultivation of justice through concrete acts of solidarity. Justice as a virtue is formed by doing just things; holding the right opinions about justice is a different exercise entirely. Concrete acts of solidarity with those whose dignity is most at stake in any given decision, the poor, the unborn, the incarcerated, the medically vulnerable, train the perception that abstract argument alone cannot.

Practice of prudence through deliberate exposure to the strongest opposing arguments. Prudence is the cardinal virtue most directly engaged in civic life. Aquinas treats it as the virtue governing all the others in practice, because without right perception of the particular case, even good intentions produce bad choices.[^3] Practicing prudence means sitting with the strongest case against your judgment before settling on it, a test of whether your own perception is honest, distinct from any performance of false balance.

Divine Mercy University's formation model operates across three integrated dimensions: intellectual knowledge of what conscience actually is in the Catholic tradition, applied practice of moral judgment in concrete situations, and the interior transformation that makes moral perception reliable rather than merely rule-following.[^5] A psychologist trained in this framework brings to questions of civic virtue the recognition that moral blindness is usually a failure of integration rather than a failure of information.

Human dignity as the reference point

At the center of Naumann's commentary is the premise that every human life carries a dignity given by God, prior to any legal recognition. Democratic processes are legitimate on their own terms, yet they still answer to something outside themselves. A selection process insulated from public accountability and controlled by a single professional association is a structural arrangement that concentrates power, and courts are the institutional mechanism through which such arrangements are checked.

Seeing that requires formation. It requires a person who has internalized an account of institutional authority and its limits, who understands why divided power matters, and who can apply that understanding to a ballot measure most voters will read in thirty seconds. The nation's capacity to honor human dignity will depend on the interior quality of its citizens. Institutions reflect the persons who inhabit and select them.

References

[^1]: Archbishop Joseph F. Naumann, "A Faithful Catholic Is a Well-Formed Voter," National Catholic Register, July 7, 2026.

[^2]: John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1993), §64.

[^3]: William Nordling, "Rational," in P. C. Vitz, W. Nordling, & C. S. Titus (Eds.), A Catholic Christian Meta-Model of the Person (Divine Mercy University Press, 2020), pp. 371–407.

[^4]: William May, lecture on conscience formation, Catholic moral theology, segment on culpability levels in erroneous conscience (00:18:00–00:25:00).

[^5]: Faculty panel discussion, "The Three Dimensions of Integration: Head, Hands, and Heart in Curriculum and Faculty Formation," Divine Mercy University, recorded session (00:15:17–00:29:34).