A Catholic Moment in Psychology: What DMU Graduates Were Just Commissioned to Do

Carl Anderson told the 2026 DMU graduating class that we already know what a psychology looks like when God has been excluded. What we do not yet know is what a Christ-centered psychology would look like. That unknown is their assignment.

May 22, 2026
A Catholic Moment in Psychology: What DMU Graduates Were Just Commissioned to Do

Sigmund Freud asked a colleague in 1918 why psychoanalysis had been founded by an atheist rather than a religious believer. Carl Anderson, speaking at Divine Mercy University's 2026 commencement ceremony, let the question stand without answering it. Then he turned to the graduates and said, in effect: the answer is not yet written, and you are the ones who will write it.

Anderson's address was not a congratulatory tour through therapeutic modalities. It was a vocation speech, and it carried a specific diagnostic claim: that mainstream psychological practice, whatever its explicit commitments, proceeds methodologically as though God does not exist. He traced this posture to Freud's 1927 The Future of an Illusion, which described religion as 'the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity' and dismissed the supernatural as a 'disavowal of reality.' Anderson's point was not antiquarian. The Freudian framework that equated religious faith with pathology still shapes institutional assumptions, clinical training programs, and the unspoken epistemological grammar of most licensing boards.

The anthropological wager

Anderson's challenge to that framework was not a plea for tolerance. It was an anthropological counter-claim. 'Christianity,' he said, 'is the recognition that God has revealed reality to us — first by revealing to us who he is and in so doing revealing to us who we are.' This is the decisive move in the Catholic Christian Meta-Model of the Person (CCMMP) articulated by Vitz, Nordling, and Titus: the human person can only be adequately understood within a framework that accounts for all three states of existence, created, fallen, and redeemed. A psychology that quarantines the first and third from clinical view is not a neutral science; it is an impoverished one.

Anderson invoked John Paul II to press this point: 'Christ knows what is in man. He alone knows it.' Taken pastorally, this is consolation. Taken anthropologically, it is a research program. The Second Vatican Council's Gaudium et Spes argued that the mystery of the human person finds its full light only in the mystery of the Incarnate Word, a claim that, if true, makes theological anthropology not a supplement to psychology but a precondition for its coherence.

Paul Vitz's critique in Psychology as Religion was not that secular therapists are malicious but that they work within a self-enclosed system that mistakes its own methodological bracketing of transcendence for a metaphysical conclusion. The bracket becomes a cage. Patients who arrive with a coherent religious identity, who understand their suffering in terms of sin, grace, divine mercy, and the call to holiness, find that identity treated as a variable to be managed rather than a truth to be engaged.

The civilization of love vs. the civilization of technology

Anderson sharpened the stakes with a distinction drawn directly from John Paul II: the contrast between a 'civilization of love' and a 'civilization of technology,' in which 'a technocratic logic and utilitarianism defines how we relate to each other.' He was candid that this logic can appear in the unspoken assumptions of behaviorist and cognitive-behavioral therapies, not as explicit philosophy, but as default operationalism. When the measure of a person's wellbeing is behavioral output or cognitive restructuring alone, the soul quietly drops from the model.

This is not a dismissal of evidence-based practice. Steven Hayes's Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, for instance, builds psychological flexibility through values-based action and cognitive defusion, mechanisms that a Catholic therapist can engage seriously, precisely because they do not require the therapist to smuggle in a reductive anthropology. The problem arises when therapeutic technique hardens into metaphysical assumption: when 'what can be measured' becomes 'what is real,' and when treatment success is defined in terms that leave no room for the patient's ultimate vocation.

Anderson named that risk directly: 'The greatest threat to human dignity today may not be found in the overt denials of human freedom, but in the more gradual tyranny which treats the human person as a sort of product that can be shaped and manipulated by a variety of technological and chemical-based therapies.' A therapy that respects autonomy in the procedural sense, informed consent, patient choice, while ignoring the person's transcendent dignity does not thereby become neutral. It imposes a vision of the human person by default.

Edith Stein and the alternative model

Anderson cited Edith Stein as one example of what a different starting point produces. Stein proposed replacing Freud's tripartite model of id, ego, and superego with a therapeutic model organized around soul, mind, and body. The reordering is not cosmetic. In Freud's scheme, the ego is a contested executor mediating between drive and social prohibition, and the superego is internalized cultural constraint. There is no positive anthropological core, no imago Dei, no original dignity to which therapy might aim to restore a person. Stein's model presupposes that something is already present in the person, a soul, an interiority ordered toward truth and love, that suffering, sin, and disorder obscure but do not destroy.

This maps onto the distinction between the Created state, the person as God intends, and the Fallen state, the person as wounded by concupiscence and disordered desire. Aquinas understood concupiscence not as the definition of the person but as a wound that deforms without annihilating human nature. A therapist who knows this distinction treats symptoms differently than one who regards the disordered appetite as the ground floor of the self. Restoration becomes thinkable, which is to say, hope enters the consulting room.

What 'missionary' means for a clinical psychologist

Anderson opened by asking where the 'peripheries' are in psychology. His answer, worked out across the address, was this: the peripheries are wherever the God question has been ruled out of order, and wherever patients who bring a religious identity to therapy find that identity dismissed as symptom rather than heard as testimony.

The historical analogy he drew was instructive. Nineteenth-century Catholic immigrants in America did not simply ask to be accommodated by existing institutions. They built new ones, hospitals, schools, fraternal organizations, because the formation of a Catholic way of life required an institutional ecology, not just individual virtue. Anderson's claim is that Catholic mental health professionals face an analogous task now. DMU itself, he said, is 'one of the most important initiatives in Catholic education in our time' precisely because it attempts to build that ecology from the ground up: a university where theology and psychology are not departmentally segregated but constitutively integrated.

The sacramental dimension of this integration is not peripheral. John Paul II's encyclical Ecclesia de Eucharistia insisted that the Eucharist contains 'the Church's entire spiritual wealth: Christ himself, our passover and living bread,' offering 'life to men' through his 'flesh, now made living and life-giving by the Holy Spirit.'[^2] A clinical psychology that operates in total abstraction from the sacramental life its patients inhabit is not comprehensive; it is selectively blind. Likewise, Jordan Aumann's systematic account of Christian formation notes that the gifts of the Holy Spirit, wisdom, understanding, right judgment, courage, knowledge, are not decorative attributes but functional capacities that orient the person toward reality.[^1] A psychology that brackets these capacities does not encounter a full human being.

None of this requires clinicians to conduct therapy sessions as catechesis. Anderson was careful to acknowledge that 'therapies and spiritual interventions must respect freedom, autonomy, and the religious and cultural diversity of patients.' The argument is narrower and more important: that a psychologist whose anthropology is capacious enough to include the soul, the sacraments, and the call to holiness is better equipped to offer culturally competent care to the millions of Christians who currently encounter a mental health system that treats their faith as noise rather than signal.

The open question

Freud's question about why psychoanalysis was founded by an atheist has no clean answer. But Anderson's reframing of it changes the terms. The question is no longer why it happened that way. The question is what happens next.

'What we don't know,' Anderson told the graduates, 'is what a Christ-centered psychology would look like.' That ignorance is not an embarrassment. It is the shape of a genuine intellectual frontier. The tradition has resources Freud never considered: a precise account of how disordered desire distorts perception (Aquinas on passion and practical reason), a phenomenology of interiority that neither collapses the person into biological drives nor evacuates embodiment in favor of pure spirit (Stein, John Paul II's Theology of the Body), a clinical theology of suffering that gives it meaning without romanticizing it, and a sacramental framework in which healing is not merely psychological but participatory, the patient drawn into the life of the divine physician.[^3]

Anderson closed with the formula spoken to Karol Wojtyla at the moment of his election: Magister adest et vocat te, 'The teacher is here and is calling you.' Applied to the graduates, the formula is neither sentimental nor rhetorical. It names the irreducible personal dimension of the vocation they have accepted. They are not merely entering a profession. They are answering a call whose source exceeds the profession, and whose answering will, if Anderson is right, change what the profession is capable of being.

References

[^1]: Jordan Aumann OP, Spiritual Theology — 'Give them the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of right judgment and courage, the spirit of knowledge.'

[^2]: John Paul II, Ecclesia de Eucharistia — 'The most holy Eucharist contains the Church's entire spiritual wealth: Christ himself, our passover and living bread.'

[^3]: A New Model of Pastoral Care and Sacraments — on the sacraments as the context for disciple formation and encounter with Christ the healer.